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Abstract 
 
There is strong evidence that comprehenders can parse sentences in an incremental fashion. 
However, when the sentence contains a negation, the evidence is less clear. Previous work 
has shown that increasing the pragmatic felicity of a negative sentence reduces or eliminates 
any processing overhead relative to affirmative sentences. However, in previous work felicity 
has gone hand-in-hand with the predictability of critical material in a sentence. In three 
experiments reported here, we presented equally felicitous sentences with critical material of 
varying predictability (operationalised as the number of possible completions) to test whether 
this might be a critical factor determining the ease with which partial sentences containing a 
negation are interpreted. Participants completed a truth-value judgement task (Experiment 1) 
or a sentence completion task (Experiments 2 and 3) after viewing a visual environment that 
provided the context for a test sentence, which could differ in truth value (in Experiment 1 
only), polarity (affirmative or negative), and number of possible completions (one, two, or 
three). In all three experiments, we recorded response times and accuracy, but also response 
dynamics via participants’ computer mouse trajectories, allowing us to test specific 
hypotheses about the time course of comprehension. Across all experiments, in conditions 
with one or two possible targets, we observed consistent detrimental effects of negative 
polarity, suggesting that the difficulty in processing negation cannot be reduced to effects 
relating to predictability or pragmatic felicity. We discuss this finding in relation to 
incremental and two-stage models of processing and outline a new account of the processing 
difficulty arising from negation in terms of a conflict between what is locally activated on the 
basis of individual words and phrases and the global meaning of a negative sentence. 
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A ‘no’ with a trace of ‘yes’: a mouse-tracking study of negative sentence processing 
 
A linguistic signal of any nature, be it oral as in spoken language, visual as in sign language, 
or written as in text, unfolds over time: rather than being available to the comprehender in 
one go, the signal becomes available in a piecemeal fashion. At a minimum, this property 
requires that the parser aggregate linguistic input before its propositional content can be 
derived. In fact, the parser goes far beyond simple aggregation: it analyses and incorporates 
newly encoded input (roughly, every new word) with the previous sentence fragment as soon 
as it arrives, a process known as incremental parsing (Crocker, 1994; Kimball, 1975). 
Representation of the partial input at each timepoint as a connected syntactic structure (Sturt 
& Lombardo, 2005) significantly reduces the otherwise insurmountable cost of retaining 
unintegrated sequences of words in working memory. To achieve incrementality, the parser 
must actively build and constantly update its representations of partial utterances, and may 
engage in the formation of predictions that will help it to integrate upcoming material (Sturt 
& Lombardo, 2005). Whereas the exact nature of the predictive mechanisms involved is 
debated (Kazanina, 2017; Nieuwland et al., 2018), the idea that language processing 
generally proceeds in an active, incremental fashion, rather than passively waiting for a full 
proposition whose meaning can be represented in its entirety, is unequivocally accepted 
(Altmann & Mirković, 2009; Pickering & Garrod, 2007; but cf. Pritchett, 1991). However, 
this does not necessarily mean that complete interpretation of the structure occurs at every 
point during input; immediate, incremental processing of material may only mean that it is 
incorporated in some way into the partial structure built to incorporate material encountered 
so far (Garrod & Sanford, 1999). 
 Alongside this background of broad acceptance of the notion of incrementality in 
sentence processing, there are a small number of cases in which this does not conclusively 
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hold. In particular, there is evidence that negative utterances may constitute an exception to 
incrementality, or a case in which immediate incorporation does not include complete 
interpretation, presenting one scenario in which it is difficult for the parser to generate 
accurate predictions that take into account all the information available. In the philosophical 
and semantic literature (reviewed, e.g., by Horn, 1989), various positions on negation hold 
that there is an intrinsic asymmetry between affirmatives and negatives, backed by 
observations from the morphosyntactic markedness of negation, with negative markers 
(‘not’) being present in all languages but affirmative markers being rather rare (St Thomas 
Aquinas, cited in Oesterle, 1962:64) to the semantico-pragmatic observation that negative 
statements (The sky is not green) are generally less informative than affirmative ones (The 
sky is blue). Views on this asymmetry and their history are summarised by Horn and 
Wansing (2017).  
This stance extends to several accounts of the online processing of negatives. In a 
pioneering study, Fischler, Bloom, Childers, Roucos, and Perry (1983) found that false 
sentences like A robin is not a bird elicit a reduced N400 event-related potential (ERP) 
component, generally taken to indicate conformance with semantic expectations or ease of 
integration (Kutas & Federmeier, 2011), in comparison to true sentences like A robin is not a 
tree. The authors interpreted their findings as supporting a sentence comprehension model 
whereby negation is processed in two steps: the embedded affirmative proposition, such as 
{is a | robin, bird} — corresponding to A robin is a bird, is processed first, while the negation 
is applied in a strictly subsequent step, {false | {is a | robin, bird}} (Clark & Clark, 1977; 
Kintsch, 1974). Similar results have been obtained in other ERP studies on negative 
sentences, supporting the view that their truth value is not always predictive of the magnitude 
of the N400 component (Kounios & Holcomb, 1992), especially if only a short processing 
window is available (Lüdtke, Friedrich, de Filippis, & Kaup, 2008). These findings add to 
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earlier psycholinguistic findings demonstrating more generally (without necessarily 
supporting a specific theory on why) that negative sentences are harder and slower to process 
(Just & Carpenter, 1971; Gough, 1965; Wason, 1959, 1961; Wason & Jones, 1963). 
Subsequent accounts of the mechanisms underlying this difficulty include the need to 
complete a processing step in which a negative ‘tag’ is incorporated into the representation 
(Carpenter & Just, 1975) and the need to engage in simulation of a model world representing 
the embedded proposition before identifying possible worlds corresponding to the full 
negative proposition (Kaup, Lüdtke, & Zwaan, 2006; Kaup & Zwaan, 2003).  
 More recent evidence, however, has suggested that the incremental processing 
difficulties associated with negation are in fact limited to specific circumstances, largely 
those in which missing contextual information makes the use of negation irrational and 
inefficient. Theoretical positions of this nature have argued that negation must normally be 
licensed by the pragmatics of the context and is used to reject what plausibly may have been 
true. For example, assertions may be felicitously formulated using negation (A whale is not a 
fish) in the context of previous assertions or existing misconceptions — in this case, that 
whales are fish (Wason, 1965), or when there is a prominent question under discussion (It 
was Mike who didn’t iron his shirt; Tian, Breheny, & Ferguson, 2010). Nieuwland and 
Kuperberg (2008) provide experimental support for this claim by showing that the N400 
pattern observed when negative sentences are used out of context as in Fischler et al. (1983) 
(e.g., a larger N400 at the adjective in Bulletproof vests aren’t very dangerous than in 
Bulletproof vests are very safe) disappears when pragmatically licensed negatives and 
affirmatives are compared (e.g., With proper equipment, scuba diving is / isn’t very safe / 
dangerous and often good fun).  
A similar distinction in processing between context-lacking and context-embedded 
negative sentences has been observed by Dale and Duran (2011) using a computer mouse-
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tracking methodology that is also employed in the current study. Their participants’ task was 
to report their judgements on the truth value of sentences using a computer mouse; when 
participants judged sentences presented out of context as true or false, they followed more 
direct trajectories in giving their responses for affirmative statements (Elephants are large) 
than for negative statements (Elephants are not small). This was consistent with the two-
stage processing view: before choosing the correct response to negative sentences, 
participants were momentarily attracted towards the incorrect one. Critically, however, the 
difference in trajectories between negatives and affirmatives disappeared when a rich 
discourse preamble was presented (e.g., ‘You want to lift an elephant?’ the mother said to her 
child, ‘but elephants are not small.’ in their Experiment 3). These findings suggest that 
negative sentences are processed in a fully incremental manner as long as they are used in an 
appropriate pragmatic context, supporting the view that negation is inherently contextual 
(e.g., Glenberg, Robertson, Jansen, & Johnson-Glenberg, 1999) and that negatives are not 
necessarily any more difficult to process than affirmatives (e.g., Johnson-Laird & Tridgell, 
1972; Wason 1965). Developmental research has identified similar patterns in young 
children: for example, negative sentences are more readily understood and accepted by 3- and 
4-year-olds when presented in a pragmatically supportive context (Nordmeyer & Frank, 
2018), although 2-year-olds appear to have more fundamental difficulties with semantic 
processing of truth-functional negation (Reuter, Feiman, & Snedeker, 2018). 
In sum, it is plausible that the apparently non-incremental processing of negative 
sentences stems from the fact that studies observing this employed negative sentences that 
were not pragmatically licensed by context. Pragmatically licensed negative sentences are 
processed as incrementally as affirmative sentences. However, the same findings also led us 
to another observation that highlights the role of predictability of communicative intent and 
(thereby) of upcoming material in processing of negative sentences. In particular, enriching 
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the pragmatics of the situational context (as in Dale & Duran, 2011; Nieuwland & 
Kuperberg, 2008) narrows the scope of possible communicative meanings and enables more 
accurate predictions about upcoming material in a negative sentence. Without context, the 
sentence Elephants are not … could be continued in a multitude of ways: besides small, these 
include yellow, extinct, from America, etc. Addition of the preceding context ‘You want to lift 
an elephant?’ singles out a relevant dimension, i.e. weight or size, and makes the 
continuation small (or similar) predictable. Similarly, Mayo, Schul, and Burnstein (2004) 
showed that negatives involving bipolar predicates (those with a clear opposite, such as tidy – 
messy) are easier to process and recall (compared to those without a clear opposite, such as 
creative, which might have antonyms on various axes, including dull, unproductive, or 
untalented), perhaps because the relevant dimension along which the negation applies is 
clear. A similar result was obtained by Orenes, Beltrán, and Santamaría (2014) in a 
comparison of negation processing in binary vs. ‘multary’ contexts. In other words, negation 
is easier to process in the presence of a clear ‘contrast frame’ (Löbner, 2000), and one way of 
supplying this is through contextual enrichment. The impact of predictability, operationalised 
as cloze probability, on the processing of positive and negative quantifiers (e.g. most/few) has 
also yielded comparable results in a recent study by Nieuwland (2016): N400 responses to 
low-cloze sentences indicated a similar interaction between truth value and quantifier polarity 
to that observed in previous studies for low-felicity affirmative and negative sentences, 
whereas positive and negative quantifiers produced much more similar patterns when they 
were presented in high-cloze sentences. This pattern suggests that quantifiers can be 
incrementally incorporated and used to make specific predictions for upcoming material, 
where such predictions are available, regardless of whether they are positive or negative.  
Following these observations on the potentially crucial role of predictability, the 
current study investigates whether predictability governs the extent to which comprehenders 
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can update their representations for negative sentences as readily as for affirmative sentences, 
i.e., whether in less predictable contexts comprehenders have more difficulty taking into 
account all available information from partial input for negatives and interpreting it strictly 
incrementally compared to affirmatives. To do so, we used the number of possible 
completions to sentences within a particular context as a manipulable operationalisation of 
predictability, while ensuring that all affirmative and negative statements were pragmatically 
licensed in the experimental context. We achieved this by using visual displays to set up 
episodic contexts in which participants were to interpret each sentence, forming temporary 
associations between certain objects and their locations inside a clearly visible grid. This 
approach avoided the introduction of any confounding effects from long-term memory 
associations (such as prior world knowledge or familiarity), which are difficult to avoid in 
sentence processing studies relying on real-world knowledge, while enabling tight control of 
the manipulation. Furthermore, the game-like nature of the experimental set-up, with its 
constrained ‘world’ and limited number of sentence forms, meant that participants came to 
anticipate hearing both affirmative and negative sentences used to describe the visual scenes 
encountered episodically. In other words, the pragmatics of the experiment licensed the use 
of all sentences to an equal extent. (This use of a constrained and game-like scenario across 
the experiment in its entirety does not imply that participants resorted to special or non-
naturalistic strategies during processing of each sentence itself. Individually, the descriptive 
nature of the linguistic stimuli means that their presentation may be compared to such real-
world language uses as describing an event after observing it, or retelling a story.) 
 We employed a computer mouse-tracking methodology to tap into the time-course of 
participants’ sentence processing and associated prediction-making or integration of new 
information. As exemplified in Dale and Duran’s (2011) study reviewed above, this approach 
exploits the idea that when participants use a mouse or similar pointing device to respond to 
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stimuli, the trajectory followed by the cursor captures aspects of their cognition as they 
formulate and execute successive stages of the response, providing potentially rich 
information on initial and intermediate processing (see, e.g., Fischer & Hartman, 2014; 
Freeman & Ambady, 2009; Song & Nakayama 2009; Spivey & Dale, 2004, for reviews). Use 
of a computer mouse is not only routine and intuitive for participants, but also requires very 
little cognitive overhead, and participants perceive almost no task demands relating to the 
method of response. This is in contrast to some other behavioural measures that purport to 
provide similarly detailed levels of information, such as the signal-to-respond paradigm (e.g. 
Meyer, Irwin, Osman, & Kounios, 1988), which requires extensive training and imposes a 
high level of additional task demand. Additionally, mouse movements are very cheap and 
easy to record. A review of the theory underlying the mouse-tracking methodology and its 
application to various topics in memory and language is provided by Kent, Taylor, Taylor, 
and Darley (2017). 
 We present a series of three experiments in which we used this method to investigate 
the comparative effects of the number of possible sentence completions on incremental 
processing of affirmative and negative sentences. Experiment 1 used a truth-value judgement 
paradigm similar to that employed by Dale and Duran (2011) and in other mouse-tracking 
studies (e.g., Tomlinson, Bailey, & Bott, 2013). In Experiments 2 and 3, we sought to access 
participants’ predictions more directly by using a sentence completion task; the findings of 
Experiment 2 were replicated in Experiment 3 using a speeded version of the task. 
 
Experiment 1 
 In Experiment 1, we aimed to examine the effects of polarity and number of possible 
true completions on incrementality of sentence processing using a truth-value judgement 
task. This methodological approach follows previous mouse-tracking studies (e.g., Dale & 
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Duran, 2011; Tomlinson et al., 2013), in which it has been found that participants’ 
predictions for critical material in a sentence can be accessed by having them judge the 
sentence to be true or false. If the participant’s initial prediction is accurate and the critical 
material matches it, they can readily judge the sentence to be true; conversely, if their initial 
prediction is accurate and the critical material mismatches it, they can readily judge it to be 
false. However, if the participant’s prediction is inaccurate (e.g., because they have not 
incrementally updated it on the basis of the presence of negation), they may initially identify 
a true sentence as false, and vice versa, before updating their judgement on the basis of an 
evaluation of the whole sentence. For example, in the Dale and Duran (2011) study, 
participants may have initially predicted large as a likely completion for the sentence 
Elephants are not… as a result of failing to incorporate the negating element not into their 
online interpretation, hence their initial attraction towards a True response for the completion 
large. Using mouse-tracking, we aimed to capture this type of early cognition to identify 
cases in which participants were more likely to make mistaken predictions and thus to 
produce mouse trajectories exhibiting initial attraction towards the wrong answer. If certain 
conditions produced this type of attraction, we expected to observe two distinct subtypes of 
mouse trajectory: one consisting of a rather direct path from the starting point to the target 
response, arising from trials on which the correct response was immediately clear to the 
participant; and one consisting of a path initially deviating towards the incorrect response, 
followed by a course-correction after updating of this initial, mistaken attraction. 
 It is worth noting that, although we refer here and throughout this article to 
participants’ predictions, the data does not necessarily reflect predictive pre-activation of a 
particular lexical item or concept. It may instead (or in a subset of cases, perhaps those in 
which prediction is more difficult) relate to participants’ early processing in response to new 
information that has not been pre-activated. However, even in this case, such processing 
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occurs in the context of the participant’s processing of immediately preceding information, 
and therefore reflects the extent to which they have been able to take the latter into account, 
in the same way that a prediction would. 
 
 
Figure 1. Example stimuli and trial structure in Experiment 1. Top panels: grids that could be 
shown during the visual context phase (exemplified in bottom panel 2); the condition 
presented here dictates the number of possible true completions for the subsequent sentence 
(basket; basket or flag; basket, flag, or kite). Bottom panels: the procedure during a trial. 
After the grid disappeared, the participant heard a true or false sentence and provided a truth-
value judgment by moving the cursor from the START button to their chosen response. 
Images and text are for illustration and not shown to scale. 
 
 We provided an episodic visual context by presenting a visual stimulus (an array of 
objects in a 2 × 3 grid; see Figure 1) followed by an auditory sentence (e.g., The bottom row 
contains the basket). We then asked participants to indicate whether the sentence was true or 
false with respect to the visual context. In such sentences, the participant’s earliest theoretical 
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opportunity to make a prediction about the critical word (the name of the object) is at the 
onset of either contains or doesn’t; however, if the negative element of doesn’t is not fully 
processed at this point, they may not be able to make an accurate prediction on negative 
trials, which may affect their initial truth value judgment of the sentence once the critical 
word is subsequently heard. In addition to the polarity of the sentence, the predictability of 
the critical word was manipulated by varying the number of objects in the grid whose names 
could complete the sentence to make it true; this variable was crossed with the polarity of the 
accompanying sentence (affirmative or negative, i.e. The bottom row contains/doesn’t 
contain the basket). Because of the nature of the task, it was also necessary to manipulate the 
truth value of the sentences. 
 We hypothesised that participants would have more difficulty making incrementally-
updated predictions for sentences with more possible true completions, and, if a two-stage 
mechanism were at work, that they would specifically generate mistaken predictions in the 
case of negatives with more possible true completions. This effect would apply specifically in 
conditions involving more possible true completions if it is the case that predictability is a 
critical factor governing incrementality of processing for negative sentences. Thus, on the 
basis of this hypothesis, we expected (i) lower response accuracy, slower initiation and 
completion of responses, and greater attraction in mouse trajectories to the foil response 
option across the board as the number of possible true completions increased (i.e., 
performance would be poorer on trials with two possible true completions than on those with 
one, and poorer again on those with three); and (ii) this detriment in performance to be 
disproportionately large (especially in regard to the degree of attraction to the foil response 
option) for negatives compared to affirmatives. 
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Method 
Participants 
 Twenty-four native English speakers (21 female, aged 18–24 years [M = 19.5, SD = 
1.7]) from in and around the University of Bristol community volunteered to participate in 
exchange for course credit or a payment of £6. Most were monolingual, but four had a second 
language of a good, advanced, or fluent standard. Ethical approval for all three experiments 
was granted by the University of Bristol’s Faculty of Science Research Ethics Committee, 
and written informed consent was obtained from all participants. The sample size of N = 24 
was set in advance. 
 
Materials 
 Visual stimuli consisted of images of highly-identifiable everyday inanimate objects 
(see Figure 1 for examples), selected for consistent naming by a small sample of British 
English speakers. On each trial, several images were presented in a 2 × 3 grid, accompanied 
by a sentence presented auditorily, of the form The top / bottom row contains / doesn’t 
contain the basket. One row of the grid always contained three images (in Figure 1, the lamp, 
garlic, and bow on the top row), while the other row could contain one, two, or three images 
(in the Figure 1 example, it always contained the basket, and could additionally contain the 
flag, or the flag and the kite). In this way, we manipulated the predictability of the critical 
object name that could appear at the end of the sentence to make it true. Although, in 
principle, an infinite number of completions are generally hypothetically available to render a 
negative sentence true, in practice only a small number of possible completions are 
pragmatically relevant, and in the case of this experiment, possible completions were 
restricted to objects that had actually appeared in the preceding grid (a fact which we assume 
participants rapidly became accustomed to). The use of the definite article the also strongly 
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implied that a new object would not be introduced into the discourse in this part of the 
sentence. Therefore, we refer to this variable as reflecting the number of possible true 
completions even though it does not always enumerate all theoretical possibilities. 
 We constructed 72 sets of visual stimuli, each consisting of 18 versions: six with four 
objects, six with five objects, and six with six objects (see Figure 1). Each of the 18 versions 
within each set could be associated with four possible sentences: affirmative or negative, and 
true or false. Thus, each set of images was associated with 18 × 4 = 72 possible trials, of 
which half were critical trials and half were trials used for counterbalancing purposes. 
Critical trials were equally distributed across conditions in a 2 (polarity: affirmative or 
negative sentence) × 3 (number of possible true completions: one, two, or three) × 2 (truth 
value: true or false sentence) design. Further details on the design and counterbalancing are 
provided in the Supplementary Materials.  
 Audio recordings of the sentences were prepared using the NaturalReader software 
package (NaturalReader Version 11, NaturalSoft Ltd, 2015), employing a female British 
English speaker’s voice with natural-sounding prosody. The audio files were manipulated 
using the Audacity recording and editing software (Audacity 2.12, Audacity Team, 1999–
2016) to homogenise the time elapsing from the onset of the sentence fragment to the onset 
of the critical word that would allow the participant to distinguish an affirmative and a 
negative sentence (i.e., contains or doesn’t). 
 
Procedure 
 Trials were presented using the MouseTracker software package, Version 2.82 
(Freeman & Ambady, 2010). Figure 2 shows an example trial. Each trial began with a 
‘START’ button presented in the centre at the bottom of the screen; participants were 
required to click here to initiate each trial, so that the mouse and cursor were reset to the same 
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starting position. The cursor was then temporarily held at this location while the visual 
stimulus (i.e., the grid of objects) was displayed for 3,000 ms, plus a further 1,500 ms for 
every additional object beyond four (i.e., 4,500 ms for five-object trials and 6,000 ms for six-
object trials). Next, the grid disappeared and, simultaneously, auditory presentation of the 
sentence began. Also at the same time as the onset of the audio, the response options 
(‘TRUE’ and ‘FALSE’) appeared in the top-left and top-right corners of the screen, 
respectively, and the cursor was released to allow the participant to complete their response 
when ready. The participant was required to indicate whether the sentence they had heard 
was true or false with respect to the grid displayed on that trial by clicking on the 
corresponding word, and to initiate their response (by beginning a mouse movement) within 
5,000 ms of the cursor release; if they failed to do so, a warning message appeared. 
 The grid did not remain onscreen once the auditory stimulus had begun, because our 
design required that participants consult a pre-formed episodic association in memory when 
interpreting the linguistic input. For example, viewing of the grid on a particular trial may 
require them to form a temporary association between the concepts of the bottom row and the 
basket, which would then cause activation of basket when the bottom row subsequently 
featured in the sentence. If the grid had remained onscreen during presentation of the 
sentence, participants would have had little reason to formulate this type of episodic 
association in advance, instead waiting to hear the sentence before consulting the grid to 
evaluate it; therefore, they would have been unable to make predictions about upcoming 
material based on these associations, and their processing of further incoming material would 
have been unaffected by them, thus nullifying the effects of the experimental manipulation.    
Mouse coordinates were sampled online every 32 ms during the response phase of 
each trial, based on a virtual coordinate space ranging from –1 to 1 in the x axis and 0 to 1.5 
in the y axis, with the origin at the horizontal centre of the bottom of the screen. Response 
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initiation and completion times and accuracies were also collected. After completing their 
response, the participant received feedback in the form of a green O (correct) or red X 
(incorrect) displayed in the centre of the screen for 300 ms.  
 For each participant, 30 trials (selected pseudo-randomly, with 10 for each number of 
possible true completions) were followed by a memory test, as a strategy to encourage 
participants to pay careful attention to every object in the grids and to explore the extent of 
variation in the difficulty of the task according to the number of objects present. On such 
trials, a prompt appeared on-screen after the feedback stage asking the participant to recall 
the objects that had been presented in the grid and write their names in the appropriate 
locations on a pre-printed grid provided. If a participant could remember that an object 
appeared at a particular location, but not its identity, they could indicate this with an ‘X’. 
There was no time limit for responses to the memory test. 
 Participants were tested individually (although in some cases simultaneously) in 
sessions that lasted approximately 60 minutes. The participant was seated at a comfortable 
distance from the screen, wore headphones, and used a standard USB laser mouse to give 
responses. The experiment began with a verbal explanation of the task from the experimenter, 
accompanied by four practice trials (two with memory tests). Participants were asked to look 
carefully at every item in the grid on each trial and to focus on clicking on the correct 
response button (‘TRUE’ or ‘FALSE’). After the practice trials, each participant completed 
eight blocks of 27 randomly-ordered trials. They were encouraged to take a break between 
blocks. 
 
Data preparation and analysis 
 Data and analysis scripts for all three experiments are available from the first author 
upon request. 
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Across all participants, the range of error rates was 3% to 22%. Counterbalancing 
trials and trials with incorrect responses (9% of all critical trials) were discarded from the 
analyses involving response time and trajectory measures. Those with response times longer 
than 6,000 ms or initiation times longer than 4,000 ms (a further 3% of the remaining trials) 
were also excluded. These thresholds were selected (in a pre-specified procedure) based on 
visual inspection of the positively-skewed distributions of response and initiation times, in 
order to trim the data at a point that would produce an approximately symmetrical 
distribution; the overall pattern of findings did not materially change when the same analyses 
were conducted without any trimming (see Supplementary Materials for further details). For 
ease of comparison across all trials, data from trials with the correct answer ‘TRUE’ (i.e., for 
which the target response was located on the left side of the screen) were reflected (all x 
coordinates were sign-reversed) using the MouseTracker software package’s inbuilt analysis 
features. All subsequent cleaning and analysis procedures were carried out using R (R Core 
Team, 2018), and figures were produced using the ggplot2 package (Wickham, 2016). 
 In addition to response times and accuracy, we analysed mouse trajectory shapes. To 
characterise the shape of a path followed by the cursor from the starting position to the 
response position, generally useful measures are the area under the curve (AUC) and the 
maximum deviation (MD). The former represents the total area of the screen lying between 
an ideal straight-line trajectory drawn between the starting and finishing points and the actual 
trajectory taken, and the latter the distance at the furthest point between this ideal straight-line 
trajectory and the actual trajectory. However, neither the AUC nor the MD necessarily 
captures all the most pertinent characteristics of a given trajectory, given that they each 
collapse a rich set of information into a single value and do not give an indication of the 
specific manner in which a trajectory deviates. Furthermore, averaging these values across 
trials may result in the loss of distinct subtypes of trajectories. Therefore, we used a 
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clustering approach as a data-driven method of assessing whether a subset of trials exhibiting 
attraction to the foil response was present. Trajectories were assigned to clusters based on 
their x and y coordinates at each time point, using the Hartigan and Wong (1979) 
implementation of the k-means algorithm with k = 2, stopping after 1,000 iterations (or at 
convergence if this came first), and selecting the best outcome from the output of 1,000 
randomly-generated starting points. Clustering was carried out by participant, across all 
conditions. After this process was complete for every participant’s data, the data were re-
integrated for analysis of cluster allocation, so that a given participant’s cluster of trials 
represented by the cluster centre most similar to a straight line was treated as equivalent to 
that of other participants.  
 Response accuracy, response time, and trajectory cluster allocation were each 
modelled separately to analyse the effects of number of possible true completions, polarity, 
and truth value on these measures, using the R package lme4 (Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & 
Walker, 2015); degrees of freedom and p values for statistical tests on coefficients were 
computed using lmerTest (Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, & Christensen, 2017). For proportional 
data (i.e., response accuracy and cluster allocation), the glmer function was used to construct 
a mixed effects logistic regression model with a binomial family error distribution and logit 
link function; for continuous data (i.e., initiation and response time), the lmer function was 
used to construct a mixed effects linear regression model. 
 Although true and false sentences were evenly distributed across the other conditions 
and truth value was not of theoretical interest, we included truth value in the analysis because 
we expected it to interact with the independent variables of interest. In particular, there is 
reason to expect an interaction between truth value and polarity: false affirmative sentences 
are more difficult for participants to verify than true affirmatives, but this difference is less 
extreme (or even reversed) for judgements of negatives (as observed, for example, by Gough, 
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1965; Wason, 1959, 1961). Therefore, terms representing the main effects of the number of 
possible true completions (n-completions), polarity, truth value, and the interactions among 
these variables were entered into each model. 
 For each dependent variable, a full model was constructed including fixed factors for 
all the above effects, as well as the maximal random effects structure that allowed the model 
to converge, for example: 
DV ~ polarity * n-completions * truth-value + (polarity|participant)  (1)  
Next, model comparisons were conducted to investigate the presence of main effects and 
interactions, using the following procedure. First, the maximal model was compared to 
models including only the fixed effects of, and interactions between, each of only two factors, 
e.g. polarity × n-completions: 
DV ~ polarity * n-completions + (polarity|participant) (2) 
If model (1) represented a significantly better fit to the data, this was taken as an indication of 
either a main effect of the omitted factor, or an its involvement in an interaction. Second, for 
each factor whose omission meant that the maximal model provided a significantly better fit, 
its involvement in an interaction specifically was tested by comparing the maximal model to 
a model including the fixed effects of, and interaction between, each of the other two factors, 
plus a fixed effect of the factor in question, e.g.: 
DV ~ polarity * n-completions + truth-value + (polarity|participant)  (3) 
 If the maximal model represented a significantly better fit to the data than the more restricted 
model, this was taken as an indication that the relevant factor was involved in an interaction 
with at least one other factor. Finally, if the above tests indicated the presence of interactions, 
the maximal model was compared to a model including fixed effects of all three factors, plus 
each of the possible two-way interactions, e.g.:   
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DV ~ (polarity * n-completions) + (polarity * truth-value) + (n-completions * truth-value) + 
(polarity|participant)  (4) 
If the former represented a significantly better fit to the data, this was taken as an indication 
of the presence of a three-way interaction. 
Following these tests, the maximal model (as recommended by Barr, Levy, 
Scheepers, & Tily, 2013) was used to estimate coefficients for the simple effects of each 
factor at each level of the other factors. Associated 95% confidence intervals (using the Wald 
method) and p values (using the Satterthwaite approximation) were computed. 
 
Results 
Response accuracy. Response accuracies (Figure 2, left panel) were modelled across 
all conditions with a full set of fixed factors and a random factor of polarity by participant. 
Model comparisons testing for the presence of main effects or interactions were significant 
for polarity, χ2(6) = 36.9, p < .001, number of possible true completions, χ2(8) = 95.8, p < 
.001, and truth value, χ2(6) = 36.3, p < .001. Model comparisons testing specifically for 
involvement in an interaction were also significant for polarity, χ2(5) = 11.4, p = .044, 
number of possible true completions, χ2(6) = 16.2, p = .013, and truth value, χ2(5) = 18.6, p = 
.002. Finally, the model comparison testing for the full three-way interaction indicated that 
this was present, χ2(2) = 6.2, p = .045. Coefficients estimated for the maximal model 
indicating the simple effects of each factor are given in Supplementary Table 1. Overall, the 
model parameters indicated that negation, more possible true completions, and falsity 
generally had a detrimental effect on accuracy, but there were simple interactions indicating 
that the detrimental effect of falsity was reduced for negative sentences, especially those with 
a single possible true completion (ß = 1.21, z = 3.03, p = .002, 95% CI = [0.43, 2.00]); and 
that the effect of increasing the number of possible true completions from two to three 
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combined with falsity was enhanced for negative sentences (ß = –0.67, z = –2.49, p = .013, 
95% CI = [–1.19, –0.143]). 
 
Figure 2. The results of Experiment 1 across conditions for three dependent variables. Left 
panel: mean proportion of correct responses; middle panel: the distribution of response 
initiation times; right panel: mean response time. Error bars in the left and right panels 
represent standard errors around the mean.  
 
 Initiation time. Across the full dataset, response initiation times were distributed 
bimodally, as confirmed by a significant Hartigan’s dip statistic (D = .06, p < .001), with a 
main peak at 2,500 ms and secondary peak at around 578 ms, precluding the use of 
inferential statistical tests. The distribution of initiation times in each condition is shown in 
Figure 2 (middle panel). 
 Response time. After trimming as described above, the distribution of all response 
times still exhibited a positive skew around a peak located at 3,347 ms. However, despite a 
significant Hartigan’s dip statistic (D = .001, p = .001), there was no clear second peak. Mean 
response times (Figure 2, right panel) were modelled across all conditions with a full set of 
fixed factors and a random factor of polarity by participant. Model comparisons indicated 
main effects or involvement in interactions for polarity, χ2(6) = 102.4, p < .001, number of 
possible true completions, χ2(8) = 118.6, p < .001, and truth value, χ2(6) = 85.7, p < .001. 
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Further comparisons testing specifically for involvement in an interaction were significant for 
polarity, χ2(5) = 32.4, p < .001, and truth value, χ2(5) = 27.2, p < .001, but not for the number 
of possible true completions, χ2(6) = 6.0, p = .421. Coefficients estimated for the full model 
indicating the simple effects of each factor are given in Supplementary Table 2. Overall, the 
model parameters showed that falsity, negative polarity, and increasing the number of 
possible true completions all generally slowed down response completion. However, there 
were simple interactions indicating inconsistent effects of falsity, with a reduced effect of 
falsity for negative sentences in conditions with one (ß = –204.3, t(4589.6) = –3.89, p < .001, 
95% CI = [–307.2, –101.4]), two (ß = –129.2, t(4575.9) = –2.42, p = .016, 95% CI = [–233.8, 
–24.6]), and three (ß = –138.2, t(4374.2) = –2.48, p = .013, 95% CI = [–247.2, –29.1]) 
possible true completions. 
 
 
Figure 3. Distribution of the maximum deviation across trials in Experiment 1, for trials with 
different numbers of possible true completions. Maximum deviation is calculated as the 
distance, at the furthest point, between a given trajectory and the straight line between its 
starting and finishing points, in arbitrary units representing screen coordinates. Densities are 
kernel density estimates. 
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Mouse trajectories. In terms of trajectory shapes, the distribution of all MDs exhibited 
strong bimodality across all conditions (Figure 3). The use of trajectory clustering, with the 
number of clusters fixed at 2, was therefore deemed an appropriate way of analysing the 
comparative proportion of trials in each condition falling into a cluster characterised by more 
direct trajectories vs. trajectories exhibiting significant attraction toward the incorrect 
response. Clustering was carried out as described in the data preparation and analysis section; 
Figure 4 (left panel) illustrates the resulting allocation of trials to each cluster. The proportion 
of trials falling into the direct vs. the foil-skewed cluster was modelled across all conditions 
with a full set of fixed factors and a random effect of polarity by participant. Model 
comparisons indicated main effects or involvement in interactions for polarity, χ2(6) = 23.0, p 
< .001, number of possible true completions, χ2(8) = 77.5, p < .001, and truth value, χ2(6) = 
58.5, p < .001. Model comparisons indicating interactions specifically, however, were not 
significant for polarity χ2(5) = 5.1, p = .404, number of possible true completions, χ2(6) = 
9.80, p = .133, or truth value, χ2(5) = 8.2, p = .147, indicating that only main effects were 
present. Coefficients estimated for the full model indicating the simple effects of each factor 
are given in Supplementary Table 1, showing that falsity, negative polarity, and increasing 
the number of possible true completions all broadly increased the likelihood of trials 
exhibiting significant deviation towards the foil object; this pattern is illustrated in Figure 4 
(right panel). The only significant simple interaction was an enhanced effect of falsity when 
the number of possible true completions was increased from two to three for affirmative 
sentences (ß = –0.48, z = –2.08, p = .038, 95% CI = [–.094, –0.03]). 
A concern for the interpretation of the trajectory data using a clustering approach 
might be that trials falling into the foil-skewed cluster, rather than representing any particular 
attraction to the foil response, might simply represent trials where the participant happened to 
initiate their response more quickly by making an initial guess at the correct answer and 
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updating their response part-way through the trajectory. This would mean that trials falling 
into the direct cluster would disproportionately represent those on which the participant 
hesitated before initiating their response, masking any attraction to the foil. To rule out this 
interpretation, initiation times for trials falling into each cluster were compared. A paired 
samples t test showed that there was no significant difference in initiation time between 
clusters, t(23) = –1.81, p = .08, and the mean initiation time across all conditions was in fact 
greater for trials falling into the foil-skewed cluster. 
 
Figure 4. Results of the trajectory analysis in Experiment 1. The left panel shows a 
representation of the trajectories taken on all included trials, colour-coded according to 
cluster. Thick lines represent the cluster centres. The right panel shows the mean proportion 
of trials allocated to the cluster representing greater deviation from a straight line (stronger 
attraction to the foil stimulus), in each condition. Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
Memory test. Participants’ performance on the memory test accompanying a subset of 
trials was scored by awarding 4 points for each correct item in the correct location, 2 points 
for each correct item positioned in the wrong location, and 1 point for each incorrect item or 
‘X’ positioned in a location that had contained an item. The total number of points was then 
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divided by the maximum available for that trial (16, 20, or 24 for 4-object, 5-object, and 6-
object trials, respectively). As a percentage of the maximum points available, participants on 
average scored 76% on 4-object trials, 71% on 5-object trials, and 65% on 6-object trials. A 
one-way analysis of variance showed that the effect of number of objects was significant, 
F(2, 23) = 18.3, p < .001. This indicates that, despite the differences in display duration, the 
number of objects did affect participants’ memory for the display, as expected. However, 
even when six objects were present, it is evident that participants were still able to recall the 
majority of them and were clearly focused on the task. Nevertheless, the effects of the 
number of possible true completions observed in Experiment 1 remained confounded with 
any effects arising from the number of objects present. 
 
Discussion 
 Two findings were strongly in evidence in Experiment 1: the main effects of polarity 
and of the number of possible true completions. Both negative polarity and increasing the 
number of possible true completions had detrimental effects on all dependent variables, 
causing participants to respond less accurately, take longer to initiate and complete their 
responses, and produce trajectories that were more likely to veer towards the foil answer. The 
effect of truth value on their responses was less clear: falsity had an inconsistent, detrimental 
main effect only on response time and the proportion of foil-skewed trajectories. 
 In spite of the strength of the principal main effects, the pattern of interactions 
between variables was less clear. There was some evidence of a two-way truth value × 
polarity interaction, as hypothesised (affecting response time, with a reduced effect of 
negation for false sentences) and the suggestion of a three-way interaction among all the 
independent variables (affecting response accuracy). However, the lack of a clear pattern 
makes it difficult to interpret these findings as reliable evidence for any particular conclusion.  
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 Based on previous findings by Nieuwland and Kuperberg (2008) and Dale and Duran 
(2011), alongside the notion that predictability might function as the ‘active ingredient’ of 
pragmatic felicity in terms of its interaction with polarity, the hypotheses were that no main 
effect of polarity would be observed, but that an interaction between polarity and the number 
of true completions (i.e., our operationalisation of predictability) would show that low 
predictability hinders incremental processing of negation, generating initially mistaken 
predictions to a much greater extent than these would appear for affirmatives. Neither of 
these hypotheses was supported by the evidence. 
 First, the main effects of polarity and the number of possible true completions suggest 
that neither pragmatic felicity nor predictability can account for all the processing difficulties 
associated with negation. All sentences presented in Experiment 1 were equally 
pragmatically felicitous (within the episodic context provided by the visual image and the 
experimental task). Despite this, negation consistently rendered participants slower, less 
accurate, and more attracted to the foil response, showing that even these licensed negatives 
were not as easy to respond to as affirmatives.  
 Second, the inconsistent pattern of interactions means that it is difficult to say whether 
there was an underlying interaction between polarity and the number of possible true 
completions in any aspect of processing, as hypothesised. If such an interaction was present, 
it was very weak (although in the same direction as the hypothesis, i.e., with a reduced 
impact of negation in sentences with fewer possible true completions), and arguably masked 
by two limitations of the experimental design and data analysis: first, the confounding effects 
of truth value, and second, the weakness of the cluster analysis.  
 Regarding the confounding effect of truth value, the interaction between truth value 
and polarity was problematic for the interpretation of Experiment 1, because truth value was 
manipulated not as a variable of theoretical interest, but purely as a mechanism to produce a 
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task that would tap into participants’ ability to process the sentences incrementally and 
update their predictions for (or otherwise respond more readily to) upcoming material. 
However, it was not possible to collapse across truth value in analysing the results because of 
its involvement in interactions with the other independent variables, meaning that it was 
difficult to disentangle the effects of the variables of interest. Tian and Breheny (2015, p. 33) 
have recently highlighted the asymmetry of true and false answers in the truth value 
judgment task: ‘Generally, language is processed on the assumption that a statement is true, 
or at least relevant. […] Verification is a metalinguistic task that normally requires 
establishing what would be the case if the sentence were true, and comparing that to 
evidence. […] Based on this idea, […] we should expect that true statements, whether 
positive or negative, take less time to verify.’ 
Regarding the weakness of the cluster analysis, Figure 4 shows that the clustering 
approach did not distinguish clearly between large deviations and relatively direct 
trajectories. This outcome can probably be attributed to two main factors: first, the relatively 
slow overall response times, meaning that not all stages of initial processing may have been 
captured by the trajectories; and second, an inadequate number of datapoints given the 
approach to clustering employed. Our data-driven approach was rather conservative, in that a 
classification of trials by hand would likely have produced a clearer differentiation between 
the two clusters, thereby strengthening the effects observed; this choice traded off power to 
detect effects in favour of objectiveness and replicability. Both these factors imply that the 
cluster analysis of trajectories is likely to have underestimated the size of any relevant effects. 
 As a result of the above limitations and the overall lack of clarity provided by the 
results, we sought in Experiments 2 and 3 to employ a task that would avoid the confounding 
effects of manipulating truth value, elicit faster responses, and allow the collection of more 
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datapoints, thus improving the power of the experimental design to capture and detect 
underlying effects in the shape of the response trajectories.  
 
 
Experiments 2 and 3 
 In Experiments 2 and 3, we aimed to avoid the problems for the experimental design 
of Experiment 1 arising from the use of the truth value judgement paradigm. In order to tap 
more directly into participants’ predictions for and responses to upcoming material, we 
presented auditory sentence fragments instead of full sentences, leaving out the critical 
material, i.e., the name of the object. The task was then to select the response option that 
would best complete the sentence. In a similar way to Experiment 1, we expected participants 
to exhibit initial attraction towards the foil response option, correcting their course mid-way 
through the trial, in cases where they had made an erroneous prediction or otherwise engaged 
in processing that made the foil initially easier to integrate. This approach offered several 
advantages over the truth-value judgement methodology, in that the design was simpler; 
participants’ predictions could be measured more directly; there was no task-specific reason 
for participants to calibrate their predictions for a mixture of true and false sentences; the 
interaction between truth value and polarity was eliminated; and the allocation of the target 
and foil to the left- and right-hand side of the screen could be randomised. 
 In Experiment 1, predictability and memory load were confounded in that images 
associated with trials with more possible true completions always contained more objects and 
thus imposed a higher memory load than trials with fewer possible true completions. The 
design of Experiments 2 and 3 allowed us to decouple memory load from predictability, and 
thereby to test the effects of memory load, through the inclusion of control trials on which the 
number of objects in the non-mentioned row was varied. On such trials, the number of 
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possible completions was always low (because the mentioned row always contained three 
items, as in critical trials with three possible completions), but the memory load incurred by 
storing all the objects in the visual stimulus varied. This allowed us to disentangle the effect 
of the number of possible completions from that of a simple increase in memory load. The 
design was identical for Experiments 2 and 3, except that in the latter case, we increased the 
pressure on participants to respond quickly by reducing the amount of time available for their 
response before a warning message was presented and by presenting an auditory response 
signal that created an impression of urgency. We expected that this would allow us to capture 
more of participants’ early processing and cognition within their mouse trajectories and 
aimed to investigate whether the same pattern as observed in Experiment 2 would hold under 
these conditions. 
 In both experiments, the hypothesis was the same as for Experiment 1: namely, that 
we would observe lower response accuracy, slower initiation and completion of responses, 
and greater attraction in mouse trajectories to the foil response option as the number of 
possible completions increased, with a disproportionately large effect (especially in the latter 
dependent measure) for negatives compared to affirmatives. 
 
Method 
Participants 
Participants in Experiments 2 (N = 24;18 female, aged 18–22 years [M = 19.7, SD = 
1.1]) and Experiment 3 (N = 32 after exclusion of one participant with an anomalously high 
error rate in responses; 23 female, aged 18–29 years [M = 23.5, SD = 4.5]) were recruited 
from in and around the University of Bristol community. None had participated in 
Experiment 1, and none participated in both Experiments 2 and 3. Most were monolingual, 
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but 21 (11 in Experiment 2, 10 in Experiment 3) had a second language of a good, advanced, 
or fluent standard. Both sample sizes were set in advance. 
 
Materials 
 Visual stimuli in both experiments were of the same type as in Experiment 1 and were 
constructed in a similar way. For Experiments 2 and 3, 216 highly-identifiable objects were 
distributed with equal frequency across 216 different 2 × 3 grids, each containing four, five, 
or six objects; as before, one row contained three objects and the number in the other row 
was manipulated (Figure 5). Further details on the design and counterbalancing scheme are 
provided in the Supplementary Materials.  
Figure 5. The experimental design and counterbalancing scheme used in Experiments 2 and 
3, with a set of example trials at each level of predictability (i.e., the number of possible 
targets).  
 
Each visual stimulus could be accompanied by one of four sentence fragments, of the 
form: ‘The top / bottom row contains / doesn’t contain…’. The number of possible objects 
whose name would complete the sentence truthfully was one (the target), two (the target or a 
single alternative), or three (the target or two alternatives), depending on the number of 
images in the grid. Thus, predictability of the sentence fragment (i.e., the number of possible 
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true completions) was manipulated as in Experiment 1; in this case, possible true completions 
were equivalent to possible targets that could appear as correct response options. Each pair of 
grids was therefore associated with 2 × 4 = 8 possible trials, of which half were critical trials 
and half were control trials in which the row referred to always contained three objects across 
all conditions (rather than a varying number), meaning that the number of possible targets 
was always three. No participant was presented with more than one trial from this set of 
eight. Across sets of visual stimuli, critical trials were equally distributed across conditions 
following a 2 (polarity: affirmative or negative sentence fragment) × 3 (number of possible 
targets: one, two, or three) factorial design, yielding six critical conditions. In total, each 
participant completed 216 of the 3,456 trials constructed; half of these were distributed 
evenly across the six critical conditions, and the other half were controls as described above, 
also distributed evenly across the equivalent conditions. Each participant additionally 
completed 108 filler trials, in which four, five, or six objects were distributed randomly in the 
grid and the sentence fragment took the form: “The left / right side contains / doesn’t 
contain…”. Audio recordings of the sentence fragments were prepared as in Experiment 1. 
For use in Experiment 3 only, an auditory response signal lasting 2,000 ms was also prepared 
(see Procedure). 
 
Procedure 
 Trials in both experiments were presented in the same way as in Experiment 1, except 
for the following modifications (Figure 6). The response options consisted of images of two 
objects that would complete the sentence fragment to make it either true (target) or false 
(foil), each randomly presented in either the top-left or the top-right corner of the screen. The 
participant was required to click on the object that would complete the sentence fragment 
truthfully. The response options appeared at the same time as the onset of the critical word 
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(contains in the affirmative condition or doesn’t in the negative condition), which occurred 
between 690 and 902 ms after the start of the audio, depending on its contents, and the mouse 
cursor was also released at this time. No memory test trials were included in Experiment 2 or 
3. The location of the cursor was sampled every 20 ms during the response phase.  
In Experiment 3, the participant was required to complete their response to each trial 
within 2,000 ms of the onset of the critical word; following trials on which they failed to do 
so, a warning message was displayed. Additionally, an auditory response signal lasting 2,000 
ms was superimposed onto each sentence fragment. This began with a brief tone coinciding 
with the onset of the critical word, followed by ten tones increasing in frequency and 
amplitude. 
 The testing procedure in both cases was the same as for Experiment 1, except for in 
the instructions (the participant was asked to look carefully at every item in the grid on each 
trial and to focus on selecting the correct completion for the sentence fragment as quickly and 
accurately as possible) and the number of practice trials (two). After the practice trials, each 
participant completed nine blocks of 36 randomly-ordered trials. The experiment took 
approximately 60 minutes to complete. 
 
Figure 6. Example trial structure for Experiments 2 and 3. The participant clicks on the 
START button to begin the trial and on the target or foil image to give a response based on 
which would complete the sentence fragment accurately. Images and text are for illustration 
and not shown to scale. 
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Data preparation and analysis 
 Filler trials were excluded from all analyses, as were trials with incorrect responses 
(Experiment 2: 15% of all trials; Experiment 3: 12% of all trials). Control trials were 
excluded from the main analyses, but included in a secondary analysis testing the effects of 
total number of objects in the display vs. number of possible targets specifically. In 
Experiment 2, trials with initiation times longer than 2,000 ms or response times longer than 
4,000 ms (a further 6% of the remaining trials) were also excluded; in Experiment 3, these 
thresholds were 1,000 ms and 2,000 ms, respectively, meaning that 8% of the remaining trials 
were discarded. These thresholds were selected in the same way as for Experiment 1; again, 
running the analyses without any such trimming did not materially affect the overall results 
patterns (see Supplementary Materials for further details). In both cases, X-coordinate data 
from trials in which the target response was located on the left side of the screen were 
reflected in the same way as in Experiment 1. All other aspects of data preparation and 
computation of dependent measures were identical to those used in Experiment 1. 
 The same approach to modelling each of the dependent measures and estimating 
simple effects was also employed as in Experiment 1, except that because truth value was not 
manipulated in Experiment 2 or 3, it was not included as a factor in any analyses. The 
procedure for model comparison was therefore simplified due to the presence of only two 
factors. 
 
Results 
Response accuracy. Response accuracies (Figure 7, left panels) were modelled across 
all critical conditions with a full set of fixed factors. The model for Experiment 2 also 
included a random intercept by participants, and the model for Experiment 3 a random factor 
of polarity by participant. For Experiment 2, model comparisons indicated significant main 
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effects of polarity, χ2(3) = 17.6, p < .001, and number of possible targets, χ2(4) = 32.2, p < 
.001, but no interaction between them, χ2(2) = 3.8, p = .15. For Experiment 3, the same main 
effects were present, χ2(3) = 54.9, p < .001, and χ2(4) = 32.9, p < .001; in addition, the 
interaction between polarity and number of possible targets was also significant, χ2(2) = 16.6, 
p < .001. Coefficients estimated for the full model in each experiment, indicating the simple 
effects of each factor, are given in Supplementary Tables 3 and 4. Overall, the model 
parameters showed that there were consistent detrimental effects of negative polarity and of 
increasing the number of possible targets in both cases, with a stronger effect of the latter on 
affirmative than on negative sentence fragments in the case of Experiment 3. 
 
 
Figure 7. The results of Experiments 2 and 3 across critical conditions for three dependent 
variables. Left panel: mean proportion of correct responses; middle panel: the distribution of 
response initiation times; right panel: mean response time. Error bars in the left and right 
panels represent standard errors around the mean. 
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Initiation time. Response initiation times were distributed bimodally, as confirmed by 
a significant Hartigan’s dip statistic; Experiment 2: D = .046, p < .001, with peaks at 333 and 
63 ms; Experiment 3: D = .05, p < .001, with peaks at 39 ms and 306 ms. The distribution of 
initiation times in each condition is shown in Figure 7 (middle panel).  
Response time. In both experiments, the distribution of response times was somewhat 
skewed around a peak (Experiment 2: at 1,118 ms; Experiment 3: at 1,023 ms); despite a 
significant Hartigan’s dip statistic in both datasets (Experiment 2: D = .025, p = .03; 
Experiment 3: D = .003, p = .015), there was no second peak in either case. Response times 
(Figure 8, right panels) were modelled across all critical conditions with a full set of fixed 
factors. The model for Experiment 2 also included random effects of polarity and number of 
possible targets by participant; for Experiment 3, the model included only a random effect by 
participant of the number of possible targets. For Experiment 2, model comparisons again 
indicated significant main effects of polarity, χ2(3) = 36.1, p < .001, and number of possible 
targets, χ2(4) = 40.9, p < .001, but no interaction, χ2(2) = 4.7, p = .09. For Experiment 3, the 
same main effects were present, χ2(3) = 60.0, p < .001, and χ2(4) = 62.3, p < .001, but a 
significant interaction between polarity and number of possible targets was also observed, 
χ2(2) = 22.8, p < .001. Coefficients estimated for the full model indicating the simple effects 
of each factor are given in Supplementary Tables 5 and 6; overall model parameters followed 
the same pattern as for initiation time. 
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Figure 8. Distribution of the maximum deviation across trials in Experiments 2 and 3, for 
trials with one, two, and three possible targets. Maximum deviation is calculated as the 
distance, at the furthest point, between a given trajectory and the straight line between its 
starting and finishing points, in arbitrary units representing screen coordinates. Densities are 
kernel density estimates. 
 
Trajectories. As in Experiment 1, the distribution of MDs exhibited strong bimodality 
across all critical conditions in both experiments (see Figure 8). The same approach to 
trajectory clustering was therefore employed; Figure 9 illustrates the resulting allocation of 
trials to each cluster. For both experiments, the proportion of trials falling into the direct vs. 
the foil-skewed cluster was modelled across all conditions with a full set of fixed factors and 
a random effect of polarity by participant. For Experiment 2, model comparisons indicated 
significant main effects of polarity, χ2(3) = 30.0, p < .001, and number of possible targets, 
χ2(4) = 88.7, p < .001, and an interaction between them, χ2(2) = 10.5, p = .005. The same 
main effects were present in Experiment 3, χ2(3) = 61.7, p < .001, and χ2(4) = 162.0, p < .001, 
 36/67 
 
and the same interaction was also observed, χ2(2) = 41.3, p < .001. Coefficients estimated for 
the full model in each experiment, indicating the simple effects of each factor, are given in 
Supplementary Tables 3 and 4. Overall, the model parameters showed that in both 
experiments, both negation and increasing the number of possible targets were associated 
with an increased proportion of trials exhibiting significant deviation towards the foil image, 
with a stronger effect of predictability in affirmative sentences. This pattern is also illustrated 
in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9. Trajectory analysis in Experiments 2 and 3. Left panels show a representation of 
the trajectories taken on all included trials, colour-coded according to cluster. Thick lines 
represent the cluster centres. Right panels show the mean proportion of trials allocated to the 
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cluster representing greater deviation from a straight line (stronger attraction to the foil 
stimulus), in each condition. Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
As in Experiment 1, to rule out the interpretation that the foil-skewed trajectory 
cluster arose primarily as a result of participants making a rapid initial guess on certain trials, 
initiation times for trials falling into each cluster were compared. In fact, the mean initiation 
time was greater for trials falling into the foil-skewed cluster in both Experiments 2 and 3, 
and paired samples t tests showed that this difference was significant in both cases, 
Experiment 2: t(23) = –6.69, p < .001, Experiment 3: t(31) = –6.09, p < .001. Hence, foil-
skewed trajectories could not be interpreted as having arisen disproportionately from trials 
with initial guessing. 
Another concern in interpreting the data is the relative roles of the number of possible 
targets and memory load. In Experiment 1, we found that participants’ memory for the 
objects in the grid grew poorer as more objects were added. Storing multiple objects for 
recall in later prediction or other processing represents a possible drain on cognitive 
resources, and the total number of objects in the grid was confounded with the number of 
possible targets on critical trials, meaning that the former factor could be responsible for 
some or all of the apparent main effects of the latter. To test this for Experiments 2 and 3, we 
examined the control trials, which were counterbalanced using the equivalent scheme as for 
critical trials, except that the possible targets were always drawn from the row with three 
objects. Figure 6 illustrates this: compare the critical and control conditions with reference to 
the images in each column. In the case of the rightmost column, there is no difference. Thus, 
all these control trials were effectively equivalent to critical trials with three possible targets, 
as the correct answer could be one of three options; however, they differed in the potential 
number of foils, and thereby in the total number of objects in the grid. Any degradation in 
performance with an increased number of objects in control trials can be attributed solely to 
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the increase in memory load. Thus, the difference in degradation as the number of objects 
increases between control trials (always three possible targets) and critical trials (varying 
possible target set size) can be taken as representing the effects of the number of possible 
targets (i.e., predictability) above and beyond memory load.  
 
 
Figure 10. A comparison of the proportion of trajectories falling into the more foil-skewed 
cluster between critical trials (with varying possible target set size) and control trials (on 
which there were always three possible targets) in Experiment 2 (left) and Experiment 3 
(right). Solid lines (representing varying possible target set size, i.e. critical trials) represent 
the same data as that presented in Figure 9 (right panels). The slopes of the dotted lines 
represent the effects of introducing additional objects, while keeping the number of possible 
targets at 3; the difference between these slopes and those of the solid lines represents the 
effect of changing the number of possible targets, over and beyond the increased memory 
load resulting from the presence of additional objects. 
 
To make this comparison, we constructed mixed effects logistic regression models 
over the proportion of trials falling into each trajectory cluster in Experiments 2 and 3, 
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separately for affirmatives and negatives, including fixed factors of the number of possible 
targets (constant or varying), number of objects present in the display (4, 5, or 6), and the 
interaction between these two factors. A random effect of the number of possible targets by 
participant was also included in both cases. (Models with a more complex random effect 
structure failed to converge.) In Experiment 2, for affirmative trials, model comparisons 
indicated significant main effects of number of possible targets, χ2(2) = 23.0, p < .001, and 
number of objects, χ2(2) = 75.7, p < .001, and a significant interaction, χ2(1) = 15.7, p < .001. 
For negative trials, model comparisons indicated significant main effects of number of 
possible targets, χ2(2) = 8.9, p = .009, and number of objects, χ2(2) = 58.1, p < .001, but no 
significant interaction, χ2(1) = 2.4, p = .13. The pattern was very similar in Experiment 3: for 
affirmative trials, there were significant main effects of number of possible targets, χ2(2) = 
48.3, p < .001, and number of objects, χ2(2) = 163.3, p < .001, and a significant interaction, 
χ2(1) = 33.9, p < .001; for negative trials, there was a significant main effect of number of 
objects, χ2(2) = 64.0, p < .001, but not of number of possible targets, χ2(2) = 4.9, p = .088, 
and a significant interaction, χ2(1) = 4.3, p = .038. Specifically, the proportion of foil-skewed 
trials increased at a similar rate to the increase in the number of objects in the display for 
affirmatives and negatives in the case of control trials (those with a fixed number of possible 
targets), whereas for critical trials, there was a much steeper increase for affirmatives than for 
negatives, as illustrated in Figure 10. This comparison supports the view that predictability 
specifically, not just memory load resulting from the increased number of objects, 
disproportionately affected processing of impacted affirmative sentences. 
 
Discussion 
 By using a completion task in Experiments 2 and 3, we eliminated the confounding 
effects of manipulating truth value that were seen in Experiment 1 and tapped more directly 
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into participants’ predictions about and responses to upcoming material. The results revealed 
a clear pattern, in which the allocation to trajectory clusters captured a pronounced distinction 
between direct and foil-skewed trajectories; in both experiments, the main effects of polarity 
and the number of possible true completions seen in Experiment 1 were replicated across all 
dependent variables, and a clear interaction arose between them in response accuracy and 
trajectory cluster allocation (Experiment 2) and subsequently (under pressure to respond 
more quickly, in Experiment 3) in all dependent variables. Interestingly, this interaction 
consistently fell in the opposite direction to the hypothesised direction, and to the weak 
interaction seen in Experiment 1. That is, the detrimental effect of increasing the number of 
possible targets on response accuracy and participants’ ability to move directly to the target 
without attraction from the foil was stronger for affirmative than for negative sentences. This 
pattern is discussed in detail in the General Discussion. 
The differences between Experiments 2 and 3 are likely to have arisen from the fact 
that participants were still rather slow to initiate and complete their responses in Experiment 
2, meaning that switching to the completion task did not provide access to the early stages of 
processing to the extent hoped for. It has recently been demonstrated that delaying initial 
mouse movements might lead to smaller effects than encouraging rapid initiation of the 
mouse (Scherbaum & Kieslich, 2017). Experiment 3 applied more pressure to participants to 
initiate and complete their responses quickly, to ensure that as much information about early 
processing as possible was captured in their mouse trajectories. This enabled the clustering 
model to distinguish more clearly between direct and indirect trajectories; thus, although the 
number of participants was only 1.33 times the sample size of Experiment 2, the power of the 
design to detect trajectory-related effects was improved. 
 Before turning in the General Discussion to a more detailed interpretation of the 
overall set of results, it is worth discussing a potential concern that in Experiments 2 and 3, 
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certain negative conditions may be indistinguishable due to chance-level responding. That is, 
perhaps performance (as measured by trajectory cluster) was already so poor even on the 
easiest trials (those with only one possible target) for negatives that there was little room for 
it to fall further: in other words, initial responses were effectively guesses, which had to be 
remedied later in the trial. The lack of difference between the negative conditions with two 
and three possible targets in Experiment 3 supports this view. However, note that this 
interpretation is only reasonable if it is the case that no more than approximately 50% of 
trials fall into the foil-skewed cluster under any conditions. The proximity of the proportions 
in the aforementioned conditions to 50% supports this view, but there are two reasons to 
suppose that this pattern does not necessarily reflect a floor effect. First, it can be argued that 
a foil-skewed cluster proportion of 50% does not theoretically represent a floor in 
performance, as the hypothesis is that participants may experience active attraction towards 
the foil under some conditions. If this occurs, it would not be impossible for the proportion of 
foil-skewed trials to exceed 50%, as a result of a combination of trials representing initial 
guessing and those representing initial attraction to the foil for principled reasons; in fact, 
Experiment 1 provides evidence that the proportion of foil-skewed cluster trials may in 
reality exceed 50% under some conditions in a similar paradigm. However, note that this 
reasoning only applies to negative conditions, as there is no reason to expect active attraction 
to the foil to operate in any of the affirmative conditions. Second, as described in the Results 
sections for Experiments 2 and 3, trials falling into the foil-skewed cluster were, on average, 
initiated more slowly than those falling into the direct cluster. The opposite pattern would be 
expected if highly deviant trials arose from time-pressured participants initiating their mouse 
movements quickly with a random initial guess. In summary, if any foil-skewed trajectories 
must be driven by random initial guessing (as must be the case in the affirmative conditions, 
where there is no reason for participants to be actively attracted to the foil), there is a natural 
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limit for the proportion of direct cluster trials at 50%; but if there is an effect beyond this 
operating in the case of negative conditions, no such limit applies. Although the possibility 
cannot be ruled out absolutely that participants’ initial trajectories reflected chance-level 
responding, these characteristics of the data support the interpretation of at least a subset of 
foil-skewed trials in the negative conditions as representing not simply a mistaken initial 
guess, but active attraction towards the foil response option, as might be observed in the case 
of a mistaken prediction. This interpretation, however, remains unlikely in the case of the 
condition with three possible targets, where the affirmative and negative conditions were very 
similar. Because it is unlikely that less guessing occurred in the negative than in the 
affirmative condition, and all affirmative foil-skewed trials must be attributable to guessing, 
there was probably not a meaningful fraction of trials exhibiting active attraction to the foil in 
this case. 
 
General Discussion 
We investigated processing of negative sentences in three mouse-tracking 
experiments by manipulating the number of possible completions to sentences (and thus, their 
predictability) using preceding episodic contexts. Across all three experiments, consistent 
main effects of sentence polarity and the number of possible completions were observed, 
affecting every dependent variable. Both negative polarity and increasing the number of 
possible completions consistently reduced the accuracy and speed of participants’ responses, 
and made them more likely to exhibit attraction to the foil response. However, in terms of the 
interaction between these two independent variables, the findings of Experiments 2 and 3 
differed greatly from Experiment 1. In Experiment 2, and even more clearly in Experiment 3, 
the findings suggested that the number of possible targets had a stronger impact on 
processing for affirmatives than for negatives; furthermore, the difference between 
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affirmatives and negatives was larger in the case of trials with a single possible completion 
relative to those with two or three.  
We begin the interpretation of these findings by considering the implications of a 
consistent and robust effect of polarity in all three experiments and across all measures, i.e., 
the fact that negative sentences were overall processed less accurately and more slowly than 
affirmative sentences, and yielded fewer direct mouse trajectories. This pattern obtained 
despite the fact that both sentence types were equally pragmatically licensed in the 
experimental context. This result has important implications, as it provides counter-evidence 
to the view that pragmatic licensing (Dale & Duran, 2011; Nieuwland & Kuperberg, 2008) or 
indeed contextual predictability (Nieuwland, 2016) is sufficient to observe symmetry of 
processing between affirmatives and negatives. Furthermore, using mouse trajectories, it is 
possible to explore the nature of the asymmetry more precisely, i.e., the difficulty arising 
during processing of negative sentences specifically stems from the interference from the 
incorrect response, as demonstrated by the comprehenders’ initial movement often 
demonstrating attraction to the foil answer (such attraction also occurred with affirmatives, 
but with significantly lower frequency). In other words, initial processing of a negative 
sentence does not always account for the presence of negation. In principle, this result is 
compatible with the claim that negative sentences are not processed fully incrementally, as 
proposed by two-stage models of processing of negatives. According to this model, when the 
fragment The bottom row doesn’t contain ... is available, the parser puts the interpretation of 
the negating element on hold in order to first process the embedded affirmative proposition 
(The bottom row contains …), only subsequently computing the meaning of its negation. The 
larger proportion of mouse trajectories exhibiting deviation towards the foil object in the 
negative condition reflects the first stage, at which the initial choice of completion (the foil) 
reflects the meaning of the embedded affirmative. However, we note that an alternative 
 44/67 
 
explanation for these findings is available, as discussed in the section on local activation vs. 
global processing below. 
Why did controlling for pragmatic felicity eliminate differences between negatives 
and affirmatives in Nieuwland and Kuperberg (2008) and Dale and Duran (2011) but not in 
our experiments? A possible explanation for the consistent main effect of polarity, and the 
apparent disparity between these and previous findings, might be located in the specific 
details of the pragmatics of the sentences presented. Dale and Duran (2011) observed that the 
main effect of negation only disappeared entirely in the case where they provided the richest 
versions of their contextual ‘preambles’ (their Experiment 3); these sentences were also the 
most similar to those presented by Nieuwland and Kuperberg (2008) in their licensed 
condition. In the case of the present experiment, although the visual contexts licensed all the 
sentences presented, it is possible that their episodic nature interfered with the mechanism 
facilitating incremental processing of negation in more felicitous contexts. There may be a 
meaningful distinction, in this case, between the long-term, stable associations in memory 
between everyday objects and their properties (for example), and the weak, temporary 
associations formed between locations and object names for a task such as this one. In this 
way, the sentences presented here may have been more comparable to those presented by 
Dale and Duran (2011) in their Experiment 2, or to the low cloze sentences in Nieuwland 
(2016): pragmatically licensed, but only weakly contextually enriched. Note, however, that 
even if this explanation is correct, it remains the case that pragmatic licensing alone is 
insufficient to account for any relative difficulties in processing of negative vs. affirmative 
sentences. Although our results are entirely compatible with the existence of important 
effects of pragmatics, they suggest that predictability also interacts (in a very distinct way) 
with negation.  
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 With respect to the interaction between polarity and number of possible completions, 
where they contradict one another (Experiment 1 indicated that increasing the number of 
possible completions had a more detrimental impact on negatives, whereas Experiment 2 and 
3 indicated that doing so had a more detrimental impact on affirmatives), we consider the 
design and combined findings of Experiments 2 and 3 to be more reliable than those of 
Experiment 1. As discussed above, the truth value judgement paradigm employed in 
Experiment 1 interacted in undesirable ways with the independent variables of interest, 
meaning that the results were difficult to interpret. Although they fell partly in line with our 
initial hypotheses, this pattern is not necessarily explained entirely by the interaction between 
polarity and number of possible true completions, but rather is confounded by the sentence 
truth value; furthermore, the data and clustering approach captured only relatively 
impoverished information about participants’ early cognition during the task. Therefore, we 
take the more surprising pattern of results observed in Experiments 2 and 3 to be more 
indicative of the effects of predictability on participants’ incremental processing of negatives.  
In Experiments 2 and 3, the interaction between polarity and the number of possible 
targets reflected a larger detrimental effect of the presence two or three possible targets 
(relative to the presence of only one) on affirmative sentences, compared to negative 
sentences. This is a reversal of the initial hypothesis that negative sentences would pose more 
problems relative to affirmatives as the number of possible targets increased. Recall that this 
initial hypothesis was based on the demonstration that the introduction of context rendering 
negatives pragmatically felicitous makes them no more difficult to process than affirmatives 
(Dale & Duran, 2011; Nieuwland & Kuperberg, 2008) and on the assumption that this effect 
arose from the relationship between pragmatic felicity and predictability. Specifically, in 
contexts where experimental manipulations rely on participants’ prior world knowledge, it is 
almost inevitably the case that pragmatic felicity and predictability go hand-in-hand: negative 
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sentences that have low predictability seem out-of-the-blue and odd (A robin is not a tree), 
whereas the contextual enrichment that makes others sound more appropriate also makes 
them more predictable (With proper equipment, scuba diving isn’t very dangerous). The use 
of episodic contexts, on the other hand, provides a way to dissociate these dimensions. In 
particular, in our study, affirmative and negative descriptions were equally expected and 
natural (participants knew that they would see grids of objects which would be described 
using affirmative or negative sentences); our manipulation of predictability, via the number 
of possible completions, was orthogonal and did not interfere with the pragmatic felicity of 
the sentences. We hypothesised that increasing the number of possible completions (i.e., 
decreasing predictability) would be more detrimental for processing of negative sentences. 
Yet this hypothesis was not borne out in Experiments 2 and 3: negative sentences were more 
difficult than affirmatives, despite their equal felicity, even in the case of trials with a single 
possible target, and this difference between conditions in fact decreased when the number of 
possible targets was increased, representing a disproportionately large effect on affirmatives, 
rather than negatives. 
How can this interaction pattern be accounted for? We believe that the interaction 
reflects the special status of affirmative trials with certainty of a unique completion. Indeed, it 
is reasonable to imagine that prediction-making is an easy and appealing strategy for this type 
of sentence. Use of such a strategy makes it possible to complete the sentence and the task 
easily (as reflected by rapid responses and direct mouse trajectories); this ability deteriorates 
sharply, even in the affirmative conditions, as the number of possible targets increases. 
Because there is no underlying reason other than a simple mistake or wrong initial guess for 
the participant to experience any attraction towards the foil in any of the affirmative 
conditions (unlike in the case of negative conditions, where such attraction could be actively 
and specifically driven by systematically erroneous predictions), the proportion of trials 
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falling into the foil-skewed cluster in the affirmative conditions reflects a minimum amount 
of initial wrong guesses, subsequently corrected prior to completing the response, that must 
be made at that level of difficulty (e.g., around 10% in the easiest case). Thus, the difference 
between the affirmative and negative conditions for trials with each number of possible 
targets reflects the addition of foil-skewed responses arising from a combination of both 1) 
any increase in initial guessing or mistakes attributable to general processing difficulties, 
which happen in this case to be imposed by negation, and 2) active attraction to the foil 
caused by some effect in which an initial prediction does not take the negation into account 
(e.g. two-stage processing or a related alternative). Although it is difficult to disentangle 
these factors, it is clear that the effect of both of them combined can no longer be detected in 
the case of trials with three possible targets, because the affirmative case shows that with a 
six-object grid, the task has become difficult enough to force participants to make an initial 
guess on the majority of trials (meaning that the proportion of initial motions towards the foil 
approaches 50%). Thus, although effects specific to negation may still be in operation, they 
are difficult to detect given that prediction is already very difficult. Conceivably, participants 
make trial-by-trial decisions (whether consciously or unconsciously), based on the global 
complexity or resource consumption of the overall trial conditions, as to whether to attempt 
to make a prediction or to incorporate all the available information into their intermediate 
representation of the input at all. 
Processing in the specific context of the experimental task may have differed in some 
important ways from ordinary processing of language in a non-laboratory context. This is 
true of all laboratory experiments, but arguably it is particularly true in the present case 
because of the especially repetitive nature of the sentences (not in their exact content, but in 
their construction and content more generally) and the fact that the visual contexts were 
similarly repetitive and constrained. However, we took measures to ensure that participants 
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could not learn any special strategies for completing the task (for example, the inclusion of 
control sentences meant that they could not assume that the sentence would be about the ‘less 
full’ part of the grid). Conceivably, participants adopted a strategy for processing the 
repetitive linguistic input that differed from the strategy they would use in a more naturalistic 
setting: for example, perhaps they were more motivated than usual to activate potential 
completions to the sentence. It is therefore possible that our experiment overestimates the 
extent to which comprehenders engage in incremental processing; however, we would expect 
any such overestimation to occur equally in the affirmative and negative conditions. 
Therefore, if participants were impaired in their incremental processing even in the easiest 
negative condition (i.e., when there is a single possible target) relative to affirmative 
conditions, this suggests that similarly predictable sentences in a more naturalistic context 
might, if anything, give rise to an even larger difference between affirmatives and negatives 
(since it is clear from previous work that incremental processing does occur for affirmatives).   
The comparison between critical and control trials presented for Experiments 2 and 3 
shows that the effects of possible target set size can be attributed to the increased complexity 
of the visual display (indicating effects of memory load rather than effects specific to 
linguistic processing), but only partially. The remainder of the effect must reflect effects of 
manipulating the target set size that go above and beyond the increase in visual complexity or 
working memory demands. Furthermore, this latter component of the effect differed between 
affirmative and negative sentences, meaning that linguistic processing was also specifically 
modulated by the target set size. 
It is also worth considering how the experimental paradigm and task used here fit into 
the wider methodological picture. As reviewed in the introduction, two other methodologies 
have been among those most commonly used to explore processing of negative sentences. 
ERP studies of negation have focused on the N400 component, and have typically presented 
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more varied sentences reliant on long-term ‘world knowledge’ (e.g., Fischler et al., 1983; 
Kounios & Holcomb, 1992; Nieuwland & Kuperberg, 2008). Eye-tracking studies of 
negation (e.g., Orenes et al., 2014; Orenes, Moxey, Scheepers, & Santamaría, 2016) make 
use of the visual world paradigm; this approach requires visual information to be presented 
concurrently with linguistic input, and hence does not directly involve memory. Our study 
sits in between these methodologies, as the tasks we have employed rely on the application of 
newly-acquired, contextually-relevant knowledge stored in short-term memory. The need to 
tap into such information is a common occurrence in natural settings (e.g., interlocutors 
frequently discuss an event that they have just observed). Furthermore, the use of mouse-
tracking in the present study lends itself to the capture of relatively early stages of cognition 
(via participants’ mouse trajectories that occur prior to the eventual response), and in the case 
of the completion task, this paradigm avoids the reliance on presenting both true and false 
sentences that is inherent in the use of the N400 as a dependent measure.  
Whereas the paradigm employed here is well suited to exploring how comprehenders 
draw on associations arising from episodically-presented information, it did considerably 
limit the range of sentences used (similarly to eye-tracking studies, and unlike those studies 
reliant on ‘world knowledge’). Thus, it is not entirely clear to what extent our findings would 
generalise to the processing of negation in other contexts or environments. Despite this, we 
would argue that we have used a context that strongly favours the use of incremental 
processing and prediction-making as a strategy for completing the experimental task. 
Therefore, in conditions in which participants fail to do this successfully, it is unlikely that 
they would do so when encountering sentences with similar characteristics in the course of 
naturalistic language processing. Specifically, given the lack of equivalence between 
affirmatives and negatives even when the number of possible targets is small and prediction-
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making thus relatively easy, the results strongly suggest that there is an asymmetry in 
incremental processing between affirmative and negative sentences more generally.  
Local activation vs. global processing 
The most robust finding across all three experiments was that negative sentences 
required more processing effort than affirmative sentences. Most significantly, in 
Experiments 2 and 3, there was more often an initial attraction towards the foil answer in the 
case of negatives. As discussed above, this result could be taken as evidence that negation is 
initially not incorporated into the sentence representation, as held by two-stage processing 
models of negation. However, we propose an alternative explanation that highlights an 
inherent conflict between local and global sentence processing mechanisms that arises during 
real-time processing of negative sentences. 
Consider the negative fragment The top row doesn’t contain… as heard by the 
participant in the context of the grid shown in Figure 6, which should be correctly completed 
with basket, the alternative lamp being an incorrect completion. As the sentence unfolds in 
real time, the listener first hears The top row, which activates the object(s) located in that 
row, i.e. lamp, garlic and bow through processes involved in simple lexical access (e.g. 
Swinney, 1979). In order for the negative sentence to be processed fully incrementally, this 
set of objects, having been locally activated by the initial fragment, should be supressed as 
soon as the negated verb (doesn’t contain) appears. The participant’s attention should shift 
away from the top row, i.e. to the bottom row and the elements therein. Hence, there is a 
mismatch between local and global representations (to use terminology employed by Tabor, 
Galantucci, & Richardson, 2004, in discussing the incremental construction of syntactic 
structure), because the early local activation that occurs on the basis of the partial input (lamp 
and other objects in the top row) needs to be subsequently supressed once the final sentence 
interpretation is derived. For comparison, such a mismatch does not occur in the affirmative 
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condition The bottom row contains…: the initial noun phrase the bottom row locally activates 
basket, which is also the globally correct output.  
There are various situations in which this type of mismatch occurs and must be 
resolved. For example, the concept of waiter is lexically activated by local elements of both 
the fragments The customer was served… and The customer served…, although it forms part 
of the likely continuation in only one of these cases; however, the parser is able to update on 
the more global structural roles of portions of the input in generating predictions (Chow, 
Smith, Lau, & Phillips, 2016). This mismatch-resolving process is an inherent feature of 
many types of negative sentences. For example, compare affirmative and negative sentences 
in Fischler et al (1983). In the affirmative sentence A robin is a bird, the local activation of 
the category bird on the basis of the initial phrase a robin is consistent with the sentence 
globally and makes the final word bird expected. Its negative counterpart A robin is not a 
tree, on the other hand, creates a local-global mismatch between activation of the concept 
bird, primed by robin early on, and the later need to suppress it once the negation appears.  
Although this view differs from a two-stage model of negation processing in that it 
does not specifically require considering a full affirmative proposition before applying 
negation, it makes equivalent predictions in some cases. Under both views, negation is an 
operation that requires considering a representation other than (and in the easiest cases, 
complementary to) the one that is initially under consideration (for the two stage model: the 
set opposite to the one denoted by the affirmative proposition; here: supressing what has been 
initially activated). This interpretation is also in line with Garrod and Sanford’s (1999) 
presentation of the notion that information incrementally incorporated into a comprehender’s 
structural representation of a sentence does not necessarily induce a full update to the 
interpretation of the input at every stage.  
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In the examples above, the local-global mismatch is unavoidable even if negation is 
processed fully incrementally, simply for the reason that in the linear input, negation follows 
other relevant linguistic material, i.e. the noun phrase The top row or The robin. This type of 
mismatch should be expected to be considerably attenuated if negation appears early in the 
linear input. For illustration, consider the ill-formed English sentence fragment Doesn’t 
contain the top row … If this word order were possible in English, then the presence of 
negation early in the left-to-right input, if processed fully incrementally, could significantly 
reduce — although perhaps not completely eliminate — low-level priming from the top row 
by immediately shifting the focus of attention to the complement location. Although such 
word order is illicit in English, it is licit in other languages (e.g., Russian). 
 
Conclusion 
Overall, this set of results suggests that predictability as operationalised here (using the 
number of possible sentence completions based on episodic contextual associations) cannot 
explain the variation in how incremental processing of negative sentences differs from that of 
affirmative sentences under certain sets of circumstances. The strong main effects of polarity 
as well as the number of possible completions observed throughout indicate that negation 
might impose specific processing difficulties in a broader set of contexts than previously 
thought, including in some cases when fully licensed by the episodic context. In particular, 
the main effects of the number of possible sentence completions observed here constitute 
evidence that episodic associations may be less conducive to the rapid and incremental 
incorporation of information and associated prediction-making that is made possible by a rich 
pragmatic context (perhaps specifically relying on long-term semantic associations or world 
knowledge). While the latter may allow felicitous negative sentences to be processed as 
readily as equivalent affirmatives, the type of licensing based on episodic context that is used 
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here makes incremental processing and prediction generally more difficult, but also makes it 
disproportionately difficult for the comprehender to over-ride unhelpful associations arising 
from the local content of the negated material.  
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Supplementary Materials 
Further Design and Counterbalancing Details 
Experiment 1 
No participant was presented with more than one trial from any set of 72 associated 
with a particular set of visual stimuli. In total, each participant completed 216 of the 5,184 
trials constructed; half of these were distributed evenly across the 12 critical conditions, and 
the other half were counterbalancing trials, in which the row of the grid containing a fixed 
number of objects was referred to; the latter were also distributed evenly across the 
equivalent non-critical conditions, and were included so that participants would not be able to 
predict which row would be referred to immediately upon seeing a grid containing four or 
five objects.  
Within each of the 18 subsets in each set of possible trials, the critical object 
exchanged roles with one of the objects in the other row in half the versions; and within in 
each of these three subsets, the critical object appeared in the left, centre, or middle column 
of the grid. The variable number of objects appeared on the top row in half the image sets and 
on the bottom row in the other half. These further counterbalancing measures ensured that 
effects specific to particular visual items, their names, or their locations in the grid applied 
equally across all conditions. 
 
Experiments 2 and 3  
In both sentence completion experiments, the target object appeared equally 
frequently in the left, middle, and centre columns on critical trials, as did the foil. There were 
two versions of each grid, in which the identities of the target and foil objects were 
exchanged. For example, in the leftmost grids presented in Figure 5, the lamp and the medal 
exchanged roles as the target and foil. The horizontal location of the target was randomised. 
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In the same way as for Experiment 1, no participant completed more than one trial from the 
set associated with a particular combination of images. 
 
Analyses Without Data Trimming 
Prior to carrying out analyses, the data were trimmed as described in the main text in 
order to discard trials on which participants were anomalously slow to initiate or complete 
their responses. To check that our findings were generally robust to the exact thresholds (for 
initiation time and response time) used for this trimming, we repeated the analyses for each 
dependent variable in the same way as reported in the main text, but with no trimming (i.e., 
with all correct trials included). The results of the model comparisons carried out is these 
analyses are summarised in Supplementary Tables 7, 8 and 9. 
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Supplementary Table 1  
Simple effects of each independent variable on response accuracy and proportion of 
trajectories falling into each cluster (Experiment 1). 
 
Variable Response accuracy (proportion correct)  Proportion of direct trajectories 
ß z p 95% CI  ß z p 95% CI 
Lower Upper  Lower Upper 
Falsity 
 Aff. 
 1 compl. 
 2 compl. 
  3 compl. 
 Neg. 
 1 compl. 
 2 compl. 
 3 compl. 
 
 
–0.99* 
–0.22 
–0.69* 
 
–0.22 
0.00 
–0.67* 
 
 
–3.05 
0.82 
–3.05 
 
–0.95 
0.00 
–3.87 
 
 
.002 
.412 
.002 
 
.343 
.999 
< .001 
 
 
–1.62 
–0.75 
–1.13 
 
–0.69 
–0.40 
–1.00 
 
 
–0.35 
0.31 
–0.25 
 
0.24 
0.40 
–0.33 
  
 
–0.35* 
–0.35* 
–0.84* 
 
0.26 
–0.56* 
–0.53* 
 
 
–2.01 
–2.17 
–5.01 
 
1.73 
–3.45 
–3.01 
 
 
.044 
.030 
< .001 
 
.084 
.001 
.003 
 
 
–0.69 
–0.67 
–1.17 
 
–0.04 
–0.88 
–0.87 
 
 
–0.01 
–0.03 
–0.51 
 
0.56 
–0.24 
–0.18 
Negative Polarity 
 True 
 1 compl. 
 2 compl. 
 3 compl. 
 False 
 1 compl. 
 2 compl. 
 3 compl. 
 
 
–1.29* 
–0.87* 
–0.89* 
 
–0.08 
–0.65* 
–0.86* 
 
 
–3.95 
–3.33 
–3.75 
 
–0.29 
–2.61 
–4.44 
 
 
< .001 
.001 
< .001 
 
.771 
.009 
< .001 
 
 
–1.93 
–1.38 
–1.35 
 
–0.59 
–1.13 
–1.24 
 
 
–0.65 
–0.36 
–0.42 
 
0.44 
–0.16 
–0.48 
  
 
–1.33* 
–1.35* 
–1.69* 
 
–1.24* 
–1.55* 
–1.38* 
 
 
–4.22 
–4.31 
–5.35 
 
–3.97 
–4.95 
–4.32 
 
 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
 
 
–1.95 
–1.96 
–2.31 
 
–1.85 
–2.17 
–2.01 
 
 
–0.71 
–0.73 
–1.07 
 
–0.63 
–0.94 
–0.76 
2 Possible Complet. 
 True 
 Aff. 
 Neg. 
 False 
 Aff. 
 Neg. 
3 Possible Complet. 
 True 
 Aff. 
 Neg. 
 False 
 Aff. 
 Neg. 
 
 
–0.70* 
–0.28 
 
0.07 
–0.50* 
 
 
–0.29 
–0.31 
 
–0.75* 
–0.97* 
 
 
–2.08 
–1.30 
 
0.26 
–2.23 
 
 
–1.08 
–1.57 
 
–3.29 
–5.32 
 
 
.038 
.194 
 
.795 
.026 
 
 
.282 
.117 
 
.001 
< .001 
 
 
–1.36 
–0.70 
 
–0.43 
–0.95 
 
 
–0.81 
–0.69 
 
–1.20 
–1.33 
 
 
–0.04 
0.14 
 
0.57 
–0.06 
 
 
0.24 
0.08 
 
–0.30 
–0.61 
  
 
–0.41* 
–0.43* 
 
–0.42* 
–0.73* 
 
 
0.15 
–0.19 
 
–0.33* 
–0.16 
 
 
–2.39 
–2.80 
 
–2.52 
–4.57 
 
 
0.90 
–1.20 
 
–2.08 
–0.90 
 
 
.017 
.005 
 
.012 
< .001 
 
 
.367 
.230 
 
.037 
.371 
 
 
–0.75 
–0.73 
 
–0.74 
–1.04 
 
 
–0.18 
–0.50 
 
–0.64 
–0.51 
 
 
–0.07 
–0.13 
 
–0.09 
–0.42 
 
 
0.49 
0.12 
 
–0.02 
–0.19 
 
Note. Reference values for each factor are True (for effects of falsity), Affirmative (for 
effects of negative polarity), Single Possible True Completion (for effects of the presence of 
two possible true completions) and Two Possible True Completions (for effects of the 
presence of three possible true completions). For example, the first row of the table provides 
the simple effect of falsity, relative to truth, for affirmative sentences with a single possible 
true completion. The statistically significant beta value of –0.99 indicates that in the 
affirmative condition, when there was a single possible true completion, the odds of 
answering correctly were 63% lower (= [e–0.99 – 1] × 100, since the coefficient represents the 
difference in log odds) for false sentences compared to true sentences. *p < .05 
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Supplementary Table 2  
Simple effects of each independent variable on response time (Experiment 1).  
 
Variable Response time (ms) 
ß t d.f. p 95% CI 
Lower Upper 
Falsity 
 Aff. 
 1 compl. 
 2 compl. 
  3 compl. 
 Neg. 
 1 compl. 
 2 compl. 
 3 compl. 
 
 
219.6* 
180.7* 
184.9* 
 
15.2 
51.5 
46.8 
 
 
5.98 
4.87 
4.87 
 
0.41 
1.34 
1.15 
 
 
4591.6 
4574.0 
4373.8 
 
4486.0 
4476.1 
4474.6 
 
 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
 
.684 
.180 
.250 
 
 
146.6 
108.0 
110.5 
 
–58.3 
–99.2 
–32.9 
 
 
291.6 
253.3 
259.4 
 
88.7 
114.2 
126.5 
Negative Polarity 
 True 
 1 compl. 
 2 compl. 
 3 compl. 
 False 
 1 compl. 
 2 compl. 
 3 compl. 
 
 
582.5* 
589.8* 
634.1* 
 
378.2* 
460.6* 
495.9* 
 
 
13.49 
13.78 
14.63 
 
8.89 
10.73 
10.96 
 
 
66.5 
166.2 
174.5 
 
162.0 
168.1 
205.4 
 
 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
 
 
497.9 
505.9 
549.2 
 
294.8 
476.4 
407.3 
 
 
667.1 
673.7 
719.1 
 
461.6 
544.8 
584.6 
2 Possible Complet. 
 True 
 Aff. 
 Neg. 
 False 
 Aff. 
 Neg. 
3 Possible Complet. 
 True 
 Aff. 
 Neg. 
 False 
 Aff. 
 Neg. 
 
 
126.0* 
133.5* 
 
86.9* 
169.3* 
 
 
50.6 
95.0* 
 
54.9 
90.3* 
 
 
3.36 
3.29 
 
2.33 
4.47 
 
 
1.36 
2.45 
 
1.45 
2.24 
 
 
83.6 
85.5 
 
4372.9 
4474.8 
 
 
4574.0 
4574.7 
 
4775.1 
4476.1 
 
 
.001 
.001 
 
.020 
< .001 
 
 
.173 
.014 
 
.148 
.025 
 
 
52.5 
54.1 
 
13.9 
95.0 
 
 
–22.1 
18.9 
 
–19.5 
11.4 
 
 
199.5 
213.0 
 
160.0 
243.6 
 
 
123.4 
171.2 
 
129.3 
169.2 
Note. Entries are interpreted in the same way as for Supplementary Table 1, with the same 
reference values, although coefficients represent differences in milliseconds, rather than 
changes in log odds. *p < .05 
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Supplementary Table 3  
Simple effects of each independent variable on response accuracy and proportion of 
trajectories falling into each cluster (Experiment 2).  
 
Variable Response accuracy (proportion correct)  Proportion of direct trajectories 
ß z p 95% CI  ß z p 95% CI 
Lower Upper  Lower Upper 
Negative Polarity 
 1 poss. targ. 
 2 poss. targ. 
 3 poss. targ. 
 
–0.68* 
–0.47* 
–0.16 
 
 
–3.15 
–2.59 
–0.89 
 
 
.002 
.01 
.38 
 
 
–1.11 
–0.82 
–0.50 
 
 
–0.26 
–0.11 
0.19 
 
  
–1.37* 
–0.79* 
–0.50* 
 
 
–6.02 
–3.90 
–2.55 
 
 
< .001 
< .001 
.01 
 
 
–1.81 
–1.19 
–0.89 
 
 
–0.92 
–0.39 
–0.12 
 
2 Possible Targets 
 Aff. 
 Neg. 
3 Possible Targets 
 Aff. 
 Neg. 
 
–0.74* 
–0.52* 
 
–0.22 
0.09 
 
–3.43 
–2.87 
 
–1.21 
0.52 
 
.001 
.004 
 
.230 
.605 
 
–1.16 
–0.88 
 
–0.58 
–0.25 
 
–0.32 
–0.17 
 
–0.14 
0.42 
  
–1.07* 
–0.50* 
 
–0.53* 
–0.24 
 
–5.22 
–2.80 
 
–3.02 
–1.34 
 
.001 
.005 
 
.003 
.180 
 
–1.47 
–0.85 
 
–0.87 
–0.59 
 
–0.67 
–0.15 
 
–0.19 
0.11 
Note. Entries are interpreted in the same way as for Table 1, with the same reference values 
for polarity. Reference values for the number of possible targets are the same as for the 
number of possible true completions in Experiment 1 (i.e., one possible target is the reference 
for two possible targets, and two possible targets is the reference for three). *p < .05 
 
 
Supplementary Table 4  
Simple effects of each independent variable on response accuracy and proportion of 
trajectories falling into each cluster (Experiment 3).  
 
Variable Response accuracy (proportion correct)  Proportion of direct trajectories 
ß z p 95% CI  ß z p 95% CI 
Lower Upper  Lower Upper 
Negative Polarity 
 1 poss. targ. 
 2 poss. targ. 
 3 poss. targ. 
 
–1.00* 
–0.82* 
–0.19 
 
–4.79 
–4.65 
–1.24 
 
< .001 
.001 
.216 
 
–1.41 
–1.17 
–0.50 
 
–0.59 
–0.47 
0.11 
  
–1.39* 
–0.99* 
–0.06 
 
–6.88 
–5.53 
–0.35 
 
< .001 
< .001 
.725 
 
–1.79 
–1.35 
–0.40 
 
–1.00 
–0.64 
0.28 
2 Possible Targets 
 Aff. 
 Neg. 
3 Possible Targets 
 Aff. 
 Neg. 
 
–0.65* 
–0.46* 
 
–0.74* 
–0.12 
 
–3.21 
–3.11 
 
–4.64 
–0.84 
 
.001 
.002 
 
< .001 
.402 
 
–1.04 
–0.76 
 
–1.06 
–0.39 
 
–0.25 
–0.17 
 
–0.43 
0.16 
  
–0.90* 
–0.50* 
 
–0.98* 
–0.05 
 
–5.16 
–3.53 
 
–6.76 
–0.35 
 
.001 
< .001 
 
< .001 
.728 
 
–1.25 
–0.78 
 
–1.27 
–0.32 
 
–0.56 
–0.22 
 
–0.70 
0.23 
Note. Entries are interpreted in the same way as for Supplementary Table 2, with the same 
reference values as those used in Supplementary Table 3. *p < .05 
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Supplementary Table 5  
Simple effects of each independent variable on response time (Experiment 2).  
 
Variable Response time (ms) 
ß t d.f. p 95% CI 
Lower Upper 
Negative Polarity 
 1 poss. targ. 
 2 poss. targ. 
 3 poss. targ. 
 
359.0* 
243.5* 
253.5* 
 
 
7.38 
4.84 
5.02 
 
 
74.3 
84.2 
85.7 
 
 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
 
 
263.7 
144.9 
154.3 
 
 
454.3 
342.0 
351.8 
 
2 Possible Targets 
 Aff. 
 Neg. 
3 Possible Targets 
 Aff. 
 Neg. 
 
276.1* 
160.5* 
 
92.4 
101.9* 
 
5.86 
3.30 
 
1.99 
2.14 
 
60.2 
67.4 
 
62.4 
67.7 
 
< .001 
.002 
 
.051 
.036 
 
183.8 
65.1 
 
1.3 
8.4 
 
368.3 
256.0 
 
183.4 
195.4 
Note. Entries are interpreted in the same way as for Supplementary Table 3, with the same 
reference values for polarity and number of possible targets. *p < .05 
 
 
Supplementary Table 6  
Simple effects of each independent variable on response time (Experiment 3).  
 
Variable Response time (ms) 
ß t d.f. p 95% CI 
Lower Upper 
Negative Polarity 
 High pred. 
 Med pred. 
 Low pred. 
 
213.4* 
177.0* 
57.8* 
 
 
10.04 
7.84 
2.14 
 
 
31.8 
32.2 
28.1 
 
 
< .001 
< .001 
.04 
 
 
171.7 
132.8 
4.9 
 
 
255.0 
221.3 
110.7 
 
Med. Predictability 
 Aff. 
 Neg. 
Low Predictability 
 Aff. 
 Neg. 
 
143.5* 
107.2* 
 
156.2* 
37.0 
 
7.00 
3.90 
 
7.70 
1.58 
 
35.6 
29.8 
 
43.4 
32.3 
 
< .001 
.001 
 
< .001 
.124 
 
103.3 
53.3 
 
116.4 
–8.9 
 
183.7 
161.0 
 
195.9 
82.8 
Note. Entries are interpreted in the same way as for Supplementary Table 3, with the same 
reference values for polarity and number of possible targets. *p < .05 
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Supplementary Table 7  
Results of conducting the model comparisons without data trimming (Experiment 1).  
 
Model comparison 
testing for 
Dependent variable 
Response accuracy Response time Trajectory clustering 
χ2 d.f. p χ2 d.f. p χ2 d.f. p 
Main effect of or interaction 
involving: 
 Polarity 
 Possible true completions 
 Truth value 
 
 
32.0* 
98.9* 
32.8* 
 
 
6 
8 
6 
 
 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
 
 
74.0* 
90.6* 
50.3* 
 
 
6 
8 
6 
 
 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
 
 
26.2* 
54.0* 
33.4* 
 
 
6 
8 
6 
 
 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
Specifically an interaction involving 
 Polarity 
 Possible true completions 
 Truth value 
 
7.7 
17.6* 
15.13* 
 
5 
6 
5 
 
.100 
.007 
.010 
 
22.4* 
9.2 
17.6* 
 
5 
6 
5 
 
< .001 
.161 
.003 
 
6.2 
6.4 
2.9 
 
5 
6 
5 
 
.289 
.381 
.711 
Three-way interaction - - - - - - - - - 
Note. Model comparisons testing for a three-way interaction were only conducted if the 
preceding tests indicated involvement in an interaction for all three factors. *p < .05 
 
 
Supplementary Table 8  
Results of conducting the model comparisons without data trimming (Experiment 2). 
 
Model comparison 
testing for 
Dependent variable 
Response accuracy Response time Trajectory clustering 
χ2 d.f. p χ2 d.f. p χ2 d.f. p 
Main effect of or interaction 
involving: 
 Polarity 
 Possible targets 
 
 
21.9* 
9.7* 
 
 
3 
4 
 
 
< .001 
.021 
 
 
27.5* 
33.3* 
 
 
3 
4 
 
 
< .001 
< .001 
 
 
18.6* 
47.5* 
 
 
3 
4 
 
 
< .001 
< .001 
Polarity × poss. targ. interaction 
  
4.3 2 .114 0.4 2 .82 2.1 2 .349 
Note. *p < .05 
 
 
Supplementary Table 9  
Results of conducting the model comparisons without data trimming (Experiment 3). 
 
Model comparison 
testing for 
Dependent variable 
Response accuracy Response time Trajectory clustering 
χ2 d.f. p χ2 d.f. p χ2 d.f. p 
Main effect of or interaction 
involving: 
 Polarity 
 Possible targets 
 
 
33.6* 
29.9* 
 
 
3 
4 
 
 
< .001 
< .001 
 
 
49.9* 
53.5* 
 
 
3 
4 
 
 
< .001 
< .001 
 
 
61.6* 
172.9* 
 
 
3 
4 
 
 
< .001 
< .001 
Polarity × poss. targ. interaction 
  
17.7* 2 < .001 9.9* 2 .007 42.5* 2 < .001 
Note. *p < .05 
 
 
